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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
A primary purpose of financial reporting is to provide information that is useful for 
decision making (FASB 2010). SFAC No. 8 (FASB 2010) suggests that because accruals smooth 
fluctuations in the timing of cash payments and receipts, income smoothing1 can potentially 
enhance users’ ability to assess a firm’s future performance. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
managers believe that smoothing makes their firms’ earnings more useful. In their survey paper, 
Graham, Campbell, and Rajgopal (2005) document that financial executives believe that smooth 
earnings help analysts and investors to predict future earnings.2 While cross-country studies 
suggest that smoothing reflects opportunistic behavior of insiders (e.g., Leuz, Nanda, and 
Wysocki 2003; Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker 2003), U.S.-based studies show that smoothing 
enhances earnings informativeness and the ability of stock prices to anticipate future 
performance (e.g., Subramanyam 1996; Tucker and Zarowin 2006). We extend prior studies on 
smoothing by identifying an important determinant of smoothing - managerial ability. 
Specifically, our study examines whether high ability managers are more likely than low ability 
managers to smooth income. We also test whether smoothing by higher ability managers 
improves the informativeness of current earnings and stock prices about future firm performance 
more than smoothing by low ability managers.  
There are opposing views about the usefulness of smoothing. One the one hand, cross-
country studies suggest that smoothing reflects opportunistic behavior of insiders (e.g., Leuz, 
Nanda, and Wysocki 2003; Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker 2003). Additionally, proponents of 
transparency, in which changes in the economic value of a firm are immediately reflected in 
                                                 
1 We define income smoothing as the intentional dampening of earnings fluctuations, consistent with Beidleman 
(1973). For the remainder of the paper, we interchangeably use “income smoothing” and “smoothing”. 
2 Nearly all (96.9%) of the financial executives indicated a preference for smoother earnings, while 80% of financial 
executives indicated that smoother earnings help analysts and investors predict future earnings. 
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earnings, argue that smoothing impairs transparency because managers artificially smooth away 
a firm’s fundamental volatility, thereby reducing the usefulness of earnings (Lang, Lins, and 
Maffett 2012; Barth, Konchitchki, and Landsman 2013).3 On the other hand, a stream of research 
shows that smoothing enhances earnings informativeness and the ability of stock prices to 
anticipate future performance (e.g., Subramanyam 1996; Tucker and Zarowin 2006).  
We extend prior studies on smoothing by identifying an important determinant of 
smoothing - managerial ability. Specifically, our study examines whether high ability managers 
are more likely than low ability managers to smooth income. We also test whether smoothing by 
higher ability managers improves the informativeness of current earnings and stock prices about 
future firm performance more than smoothing by low ability managers. 
We employ a powerful setting for informing the debate surrounding the usefulness of 
smoothing because it likely varies cross-sectionally with managerial ability (Demski 1998; 
Schipper and Vincent 2003; Kirschenheiter and Melumad 2004). To effectively smooth earnings, 
managers must accurately forecast earnings. Accurate earnings forecasts, in turn, require a keen 
understanding of firms’ economic prospects. Supporting this argument, prior research shows that 
managerial ability is positively related to the accuracy of management earnings forecasts (Baik, 
Farber, and Lee 2011) and accruals (Demerjian, Lev, Lewis, and McVay 2013), and that high 
ability managers have superior business knowledge compared to low ability managers (Coff 
1999; Holcomb, Holmes, and Connelly 2009). Thus, high ability managers can use smoothing as 
a channel to reduce information asymmetry. While low ability managers might also smooth 
earnings, given the skills required to smooth and the potential costs associated with poor 
smoothing decisions (e.g., financial misstatements, diminished reputation, job loss), we expect 
                                                 
3 Please see Section II for a more thorough discussion of the smoothing versus transparency debate.  
3 
 
 
that low ability managers are less likely to smooth. We therefore expect that compared to low 
ability managers, high ability managers are more likely to use their discretion to reveal their 
private information through smoothing.4, 5  
An important research question that we address is whether smoothing by high ability 
managers enhances the informativeness of current earnings about future performance. Given that 
high ability managers possess superior skill to anticipate changes in their firms’ underlying 
economics, to estimate accruals (Demerjian et al. 2013), and to forecast earnings (Baik et al. 
2011), we expect that smoothing by high ability managers incorporates more forward-looking 
information (i.e., future cash flows) into current earnings, thereby improving earnings 
informativeness. In contrast to high ability managers, low ability managers are less skillful in 
predicting changes in their firms’ economics, and to the extent that they smooth earnings, these 
earnings likely contain noise, thereby reducing earnings informativeness. We also examine 
whether smoothing by high ability managers enhances stock price informativeness more so than 
smoothing by low ability managers.  
We execute our tests using a common factor for firm-level smoothing based on three 
measures of smoothing used in cross-country and U.S.-based studies (e.g., Leuz et al. 2003; 
Tucker and Zarowin 2006; Dou, Hope, and Thomas 2013): (i) standard deviation of earnings 
divided by standard deviation of cash flows from operations; (ii) correlation between changes in 
accruals and changes in cash flows from operations; and (iii) correlation between changes in 
                                                 
4 Smoothing is a credible signal because managers would be irrational to report earnings that are higher than what 
they expect to persist because their firms would likely incur negative capital market consequences and managerial 
reputation would likely decline. This argument is consistent with that in Ronen and Sadan (1981), who adopt 
Spence’s (1973) model to predict firms’ smoothing.  
5 However, high ability managers have more to lose in terms of compensation (Falato, Li, and Milbourn 2012; 
Graham, Li, and Qiu 2012) and reputation (Fudenberg and Tirole 1995) if unexpected negative shocks in the future 
lead to a poor mapping of current earnings to future earnings realizations. Thus, higher ability managers likely have 
less of an incentive to smooth if the costs of doing so outweigh the benefits. 
4 
 
 
discretionary accruals and changes in pre-managed earnings. Our main proxy for managerial 
ability is MA-Score (Demerjian, Lev, and McVay 2012), which is a measure of the ability of a 
firm’s management team derived from Data Envelope Analysis (DEA).  
We conduct our analyses using a large sample of U.S. firms over the period 1991-2011. 
As a first step in our examination, we assess whether managerial ability is positively related to 
smoothing and find that this is indeed the case. We next examine whether smoothing by high 
ability managers incorporates more forward-looking information into current earnings than 
smoothing by low ability managers. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that smoothing by 
high ability managers enhances the ability of current earnings to predict future cash flows. In 
contrast, smoothing by low ability managers reduces the ability of current earnings to predict 
future cash flows. This finding is economically significant in that, at the highest level of 
smoothing, the magnitude of the relation between current earnings and future cash flows for high 
ability managers is about two times greater than that for low ability managers. This contrasting 
impact of smoothing by high versus low ability managers on earnings informativeness highlights 
the importance of considering managerial ability in assessing the usefulness of smoothing.  
We next examine the impact of smoothing by high ability managers on stock price 
informativeness. To do so, we modify a future earnings response coefficient (FERC) model 
(Collins, Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan 1994; Lundholm and Myers 2002; Tucker and Zarowin 
2006) by decomposing earnings into accruals and cash flows.6 We show that smoothing by high 
ability managers enhances stock price informativeness about future cash flows. Similar to the 
results from the earnings informativeness test, we also show that smoothing by low ability 
                                                 
6 This model allows us to draw inferences about whether the market actually receives the signal and impounds 
information about future performance that is embedded in smoothed earnings (Orpurt and Zang 2009). 
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managers reduces stock price informativeness. Additionally, we re-run the stock price 
informativeness test using a 30-day earnings announcement period and a 30-day non-earnings 
announcement period, similar to Muslu, Radhakrishnan, Subramanyam, and Lim (2015). We 
find evidence that the effect of managerial ability on stock price informativeness is concentrated 
around the earnings announcement period, supporting the view that current earnings is a channel 
through which smoothing by high ability managers conveys information to equity investors. 
Overall, results from the stock price informativeness tests are consistent with the characterization 
of smoothing by high ability managers as a credible signal to equity investors about firms’ future 
performance.  
We conduct a host of robustness tests, including using a constant management sample 
and within-firm variation in managerial ability, testing cross-sectional variation in firms’ 
information asymmetry, using alternative signaling channels, and employing alternative models 
of earnings informativeness. Results of these additional tests are consistent with our main 
inference that smoothing by high ability managers reveals private information to equity 
investors.  
Our study makes several important contributions to the literature. First, we add to the 
literature examining the usefulness of smoothing and, more broadly, to the literature on the use 
of financial reporting to communicate managers’ private information (Subramanyam 1996; 
Demski 1998; Louis and Robinson 2005; Tucker and Zarowin 2006; Louis and White 2007; 
Badertscher, Collins, and Lys 2012). In U.S.-based studies on the informativeness of smoothing, 
Subramanyam (1996) and Tucker and Zarowin (2006) report that smoothing improves the 
informativeness of earnings and stock prices. We extend Subramanyam (1996) and Tucker and 
Zarowin (2006) by identifying an important new source of variation in smoothing - managerial 
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ability - and linking it to the informativeness of earnings and stock prices about future 
performance.  
Overall, our study highlights that smoothing can be beneficial. This seemingly contrasts 
with the view held by some regulators and academics that firms should avoid smoothing because 
it misrepresents their true economic performance (Levitt 1998; Leuz et al. 2003). Further 
highlighting the importance of this issue is standard setters’ shift towards a fair value model of 
reporting. Countering this view, Hann, Heflin, and Subramanyam (2007a) show that the 
smoothing provisions of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 87 are more value 
relevant than a fair value model for pension accounting. Results from our study suggest that 
more capable managers who use discretionary accounting choices to signal future performance 
via smoothing provide more useful financial reporting, in line with the conceptual framework of 
financial reporting. Thus, an important take-away from our study is that under certain conditions, 
smoothing can be an important mechanism to enhance earnings quality and can supplement the 
inherent shortcomings of fair value reporting (Sankar and Subramanyam 2001).  
Our study is also related to the emerging stream of research on the role of managerial 
ability in the determination and consequences of earnings quality (Demerjian et al. 2013; 
Demerjian, Lewis, and McVay 2017).7  We also extend research on determinants of smoothing 
(Dascher and Malcom 1970; Barnea, Ronen, and Sadan 1976; McNichols and Wilson 1988; 
Chaney, Jeter, and Lewis 1998; Kanagaretnam, Lobo, and Yang 2004) by identifying managerial 
ability as an important determinant of smoothing. Finally, our study answers Dechow, Ge, and 
                                                 
7 In a contemporaneous study, Demerjian et al. (2017) also find a positive association between managerial ability 
and smoothing. Our study primarily differs from Demerjian et al. (2017) in that we assess the impact of smoothing 
by high ability managers on the informativeness of earnings and stock prices, while Demerjian et al. (2017) focus on 
the future operating performance consequences associated with smoothing by high ability managers and their 
incentives to smooth. We discuss Demerjian et al. (2017) in more detail in Section II. 
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Schrand’s (2010) call for more research that uses a complete path approach, which provides 
deeper insights than research that only examines either determinants or consequences of 
smoothing. Findings from our study should be of interest to regulators, researchers, practitioners, 
and others concerned with understanding the determinants and usefulness of income smoothing.  
Our study proceeds as follows. In section II, we review the relevant literature and develop 
our hypotheses. In section III, we provide our data and methodology. Section IV discusses our 
main empirical results and additional tests. We summarize and conclude our study in section V. 
 II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
Our study is related to research that investigates determinants and consequences of 
smoothing, and to research that assesses the role of managerial ability in financial reporting. 
Below, we briefly review this literature and develop our hypotheses. 
Benefits and Costs of Smoothing 
Following Beidleman (1973), we define smoothing as the use of managerial discretion to 
dampen fluctuations in earnings streams. On the one hand, smoothing provides several benefits. 
Prior research suggests that managers use their private information about future events to 
determine earnings such that reported earnings are close to their firm’s permanent earnings 
(Chaney and Lewis 1995; Chaney et al. 1998). Smoothing therefore allows managers to 
communicate a firm’s true economic performance, thereby helping investors and analysts to 
predict future earnings (Subramanyam 1996; Tucker and Zarowin 2006). Smooth income also 
has the potential to lower investors’ estimates of firm’s underlying earnings volatility and thus 
results in a lower risk premium (Trueman and Titman 1988). Consistent with this argument, 
Barth, Elliott, and Finn (1999) find that firms reporting strings of year-over-year increases in 
earnings are priced at a premium and Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2004) show that 
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income smoothing is associated with a lower cost of equity. Stakeholders, such as customers and 
suppliers, also reward smoother earnings with better terms of trade (Graham et al. 2005; Dou et 
al. 2013). Furthermore, managers may benefit from smooth earnings because they can increase 
the value of managers’ stock-based compensation and improve their job security (DeFond and 
Park 1997).  
On the other hand, smoothing can be costly. Smoothing decisions may begin the slippery 
slope to financial misreporting (Schrand and Zechman 2012). For example, if a manager borrows 
from the future (i.e., shifts accruals from the future to the present) to improve current 
performance, and her optimistic performance expectations are not subsequently realized, then 
she is likely to be forced to engage in more aggressive accounting choices to cover the reversal 
of the previous period’s optimistic adjustment and to maintain the trend set by previous earnings 
(Myers, Myers, and Skinner 2007). Thus, managers’ initial accounting adjustments based on an 
inaccurate prediction of future prospects likely increase the frequency of financial misstatements 
and litigation.  
In addition, managers’ accounting choices to smooth earnings may increase the 
likelihood of restatements, enforcement actions, and litigation. For example, Badertscher et al. 
(2012) show that discretionary accounting choices that are not for opportunistic reasons can also 
result in restatements because managers’ ex ante view of what is within the boundaries of GAAP 
may differ from regulators’ view, ex post. As a result, managers are likely to experience negative 
reputation and career consequences such as dismissal (Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins 2006; 
Hazarika, Karpoff, and Nahata 2012). In addition, as effective smoothing requires managers to 
identify specific techniques to achieve the desired adjustments, managers may need to make 
costly adjustments to their accounting process, which may adversely affect firm value. In 
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summary, when considering benefits and costs of income smoothing, we expect managers to 
weigh the “net” benefit of smoothing when making smoothing decisions. 
Managerial Ability and Smoothing 
There is a fairly well developed empirical literature on determinants of smoothing (e.g., 
Dascher and Malcom 1970; Barnea et al. 1976; McNichols and Wilson 1988; Chaney et al. 1998; 
Kanagaretnam et al. 2004). We extend this literature by examining whether a managerial 
characteristic, namely ability, affects smoothing. Prior research suggests a plausible link between 
managerial ability and smoothing. Ronen and Sadan (1981) adapt Spence’s (1973) signaling 
model to argue that smoothing is a credible signal because managers would be irrational to report 
earnings that they do not expect to persist due to the significant costs that firms and managers 
would incur in terms of negative capital market consequences and a diminution of managerial 
reputation. 
 Moreover, the ability to develop high quality expectations about future earnings 
necessarily requires superior ability to forecast changes in firms’ economic prospects. That is, to 
effectively smooth earnings, managers must accurately forecast earnings, which requires an 
acute understanding of firms’ economic prospects. Supporting this argument, prior research 
shows that higher ability managers have superior business knowledge compared to lower ability 
managers (Coff 1999; Holcomb et al. 2009) and that managerial ability is positively related to 
the accuracy of management earnings forecasts (Baik et al. 2011) and the accuracy of accruals 
(Demerjian et al. 2013).  
More directly related to the relation between managerial ability and smoothing, Chaney 
and Lewis (1995) provide a model based on Spence (1973) to argue that “high-quality” firms use 
smoothing to signal their type. Demski (1998) shows that smoothing is desirable in efficient 
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contracting when hard-working (i.e., more capable) managers are able to observe future output in 
a timely manner. Sankar and Subramanyam (2001) develop a two-period model in which 
managers smooth income to communicate their private information through reported earnings. 
Smoothing can thus alleviate information asymmetry between managers and investors. Schipper 
and Vincent (2003) suggest that managers with superior information about future earnings 
innovations are well positioned to smooth earnings. In a contemporaneous study, Demerjian et 
al. (2017) also assess the relation between smoothing and managerial ability. Demerjian et al. 
(2017) find that high ability managers are more likely to engage in intentional smoothing. They 
also report that high ability managers’ intentional smoothing is associated with superior future 
earnings and that the degree of smoothing is related to high ability managers’ incentives to 
benefit shareholders (e.g., avoiding debt covenant violations) but not related to the incentives for 
their personal gains (e.g., insider trading). While we also find a positive association between 
managerial ability and smoothing, our study differs from Demerjian et al. (2017) in several 
important ways. First, our study focuses on the usefulness of smoothing in terms of earnings 
informativeness and stock price informativeness, while Demerjian et al. (2017) focus on the 
operating consequences of smoothing and managers’ incentives to smooth. We address the 
question of the usefulness of smoothing because helping investors’ decision-making is a key 
issue in theoretical and empirical papers on smoothing (Subramanyam 1996; Demski 1998; 
Sankar and Subramanyam 2001; Tucker and Zarowin 2006). Second, we view smoothing as a 
signaling channel to address information asymmetry, while Demerjian et al. (2017) view 
smoothing as a form of earnings management. Their view is reflected in their measurement of 
smoothing as a principal component of the absolute value of discretionary accruals and real 
earnings management, while our study adopts multiple measures of smoothing from the prior 
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smoothing literature. Overall, the two studies complement each other in providing evidence on 
the association between managerial ability and smoothing.  
While the preceding discussion suggests a positive relation between managerial ability 
and smoothing, this does not negate the possibility that low ability managers would also smooth 
earnings to mimic the strategy of high ability managers (i.e., pooling equilibrium where high and 
low ability managers choose the same level of smoothing) or to obfuscate their poor 
performance. However, since low ability managers have inferior private information about their 
firms’ economic prospects and accruals generation process compared to high ability managers, 
low ability managers are more likely than high ability managers to err when making smoothing 
decisions. As such, low ability managers who smooth are more likely than high ability managers 
to bear the costs associated with smoothing, as previously discussed. Specifically, if a manager 
with poor forecasting ability borrows too much from the future to improve current performance 
and future performance is not as good as expected, then smoothing may result in increased 
earnings volatility, as future earnings realizations will be worse than those without smoothing. 
Accounting adjustments based on poor forecasts may also lead to financial misstatements and 
legal actions, thereby resulting in diminished managerial reputation, potential job loss, and lower 
equity-based wealth for managers. In addition, low ability managers may need to resort to more 
costly adjustments to smooth income, which may adversely affect firm value. 
Given the skills required to smooth and the potential costs associated with poor 
smoothing decisions, low ability managers would likely be more constrained from smoothing 
than high ability managers and thus should be less likely to engage in as much smoothing as high 
ability managers. In other words, high ability managers are more likely to have a net benefit from 
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smoothing than are low ability managers. The preceding analysis leads to our first hypothesis, 
stated in the alternative form: 
H1: There is a positive relation between smoothing and managerial ability.  
 
We may not find evidence consistent with our hypothesis if the costs of smoothing 
outweigh the benefits of doing so. High ability managers might suffer a loss of compensation 
(Graham, Liu, and Qiu 2012; Falato et al. 2012) and reputation (Fudenberg and Tirole 1995) if 
unexpected negative shocks in the future lead to a poor mapping of current earnings (based on 
smoothing) to future earnings realizations. Additionally, Ronen and Sadan (1981) argue that 
smoothing is costly due to actions by auditors, legal liability, or regulatory intervention (e.g., 
SEC enforcement). Moreover, potential costs associated with the revelation of proprietary 
information also likely reduce incentives to smooth. Managers plausibly incorporate the 
likelihood of these costs when making smoothing decisions.  
It is possible that high ability managers are also in a better position than low ability 
managers to make one-time charges (e.g., asset write-offs) because taking charges also requires 
private information about the underlying performance of the firm. 8 To the extent that high ability 
managers are more likely to show “big bath reporting” to provide private information about firms’ 
performance, we might observe a negative relation between managerial ability and smoothing. 
However, given the asymmetric nature of asset write-offs, we expect that communication 
achieved via write-offs is less likely to reveal private information. In other words, the 
communication through asset write-offs can occur only when there is substantial negative news 
exceeding a certain threshold due to accounting standards, which in turn deters timely 
communication with the market. For example, the threshold for a goodwill write-off is 
                                                 
8 We thank the editor for suggesting this alternative view. 
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undiscounted cash flows instead of discounted cash flows. Consistent with our view, existing 
empirical evidence shows that asset write-offs reflect managers’ opportunistic reporting behavior 
rather than the provision of their private information (Riedl 2004; Ramanna and Watts 2012).  
The Impact of Smoothing on the Informativeness of Earnings and Stock Prices about 
Future Performance 
 
A natural question arising from our discussion about the relation between managerial 
ability and smoothing is whether smoothing associated with managerial ability is useful for 
decision making. Prior cross-country studies generally provide results suggesting that smoothing 
reduces earnings informativeness. Leuz et al. (2003) show that smoothing is higher in countries 
with weaker investor protection. Bhattacharya et al. (2003) find that smoothing is related to a 
higher cost of capital and lower trading volume. Biddle and Hilary (2006) report that smoothing 
is related to lower investment efficiency, while DeFond, Hung, and Trezevant (2007) show that 
more smoothing leads to higher variance in returns around annual earnings announcements. In 
sum, cross-country studies suggest that managers in countries with weak investor protection use 
smoothing to conceal private benefits of control, suggesting negative economic consequences 
associated with smoothing.  
U.S.-based studies, on the other hand, highlight that smoothing, on average, improves 
earnings informativeness and stock price informativeness about future performance. 
Subramanyam (1996) reports a positive relation between discretionary accruals and stock 
returns, and that smoothing improves the persistence and predictability of earnings. Tucker and 
Zarowin (2006) report that smoothing improves stock price informativeness about future 
performance. We extend prior research by identifying a new potential source of cross-sectional 
variation in smoothing, managerial ability, and by assessing whether it improves the 
informativeness of current earnings and stock prices about future performance. As Dechow et al. 
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(2010, p. 390) indicate, studies that take a complete path approach “…substantially enhance our 
understanding of earnings quality”. Our assessment of the relation between managerial ability 
and smoothing, as well as the impact of managerial ability on the informativeness of earnings 
and stock prices about future firm performance, provides such a complete path.  
To the extent that high ability managers have superior skills in assessing their firms’ 
future performance, we expect that smoothing by high ability managers likely incorporates more 
forward-looking information into current earnings to reveal their private information about future 
cash flows in U.S. firms (Sankar and Subramanyam 2001). In contrast, we expect that smoothing 
by low ability managers may introduce noise in reported earnings because their skill at 
forecasting changes in their firms’ economics is low. To this point, Kirschenheiter and Melumad 
(2004) theorize that, in equilibrium, smoothing by better informed managers improves earnings 
quality, while smoothing by relatively uninformed managers provides no information benefits 
because they cannot distinguish between the permanent and transitory components of earnings.  
This suggests that smoothing by low ability managers can reduce earnings informativeness. 
Thus, compared to smooth earnings reported by low ability managers, smooth earnings reported 
by high ability managers likely contain more information about future performance. The 
foregoing arguments lead to the second hypothesis, stated in the alternative form, as follows: 
H2: Compared to smoothing by low ability managers, smoothing by high ability 
managers enhances the informativeness of current earnings about future 
performance. 
 
Tucker and Zarowin (2006) provide evidence suggesting that stock prices incorporate 
more information about future performance when firms smooth their earnings. The rationale 
underlying this result is that since managers with more information about their firm’s future can 
smooth successfully, current earnings reveal information about a firm’s future performance. 
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Smoothed current earnings can therefore act as a mechanism that allows investors to predict a 
firm’s future economic performance. We extend Tucker and Zarowin (2006) by assessing 
whether smoothing by high ability managers improves stock price informativeness in U.S. firms. 
As discussed above, high ability managers are likely to use smoothing to reveal their private 
information about future firm performance. Given high ability managers’ superior skill at 
assessing changes in their firms’ economics, smoothing by high ability managers likely provides 
investors with an accurate picture of future firm performance. If so, then smoothing by high 
ability managers would allow current stock returns to better anticipate future cash flows, thereby 
enhancing stock price informativeness. To the extent that low ability managers smooth earnings 
and that their smoothing decisions introduce noise, as discussed earlier, we expect that 
smoothing by low ability managers would reduce stock price informativeness. This discussion 
leads to our third hypothesis stated in the alternative form, as follows:  
H3: Compared to smoothing by low ability managers, smoothing by high ability 
managers enhances the informativeness of current stock prices about future 
performance. 
 
The Debate about Smoothing versus Transparency 
 
Our study is related to the debate about the appropriate model for financial reporting. 
Some regulators and academics hold the view that the most desirable property of earnings is 
transparency, in which changes in the economic value of a firm are immediately reflected in 
earnings through fair value accounting (Barth et al. 2013). Proponents of a fair value model view 
smoothing as an impediment to transparent and relevant financial reporting because it artificially 
smooths volatility that reflects a firm’s fundamentals (Lang et al. 2002; Leuz et al. 2003; Scott 
2012). 
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While we acknowledge that a fair value model can improve the usefulness of earnings 
under certain circumstances (e.g., for individual financial assets and liabilities that are traded in 
active markets), we argue that smoothing can be beneficial and co-exist with transparency. 
Smoothing can provide a remedy for several drawbacks of fair value accounting because 
managers can reveal private information about future cash flows by smoothing reported earnings 
such that they are closer to the firm’s permanent earnings (Chaney and Lewis 1995; Chaney et 
al. 1998). Furthermore, to the extent that smoothing can be used to reflect changes in the 
economic value of a firm, smoothing can potentially improve, rather than impair, the relevance 
of earnings. While research on smoothing versus fair value is scarce, Hann et al. (2007a) provide 
evidence that a fair value model impairs relevance because more transitory components of 
earnings are not isolated from more persistent components of earnings, while a smoothing model 
enhances relevance. Their results suggest that smoothing can improve relevance in settings 
where the limitations of a fair value model are amplified. 9  Additionally, Hann, Lu, and 
Subramanyam (2007b) and Badertscher et al. (2012) suggest that managers’ discretion in 
financial reporting can enhance relevance.10  
Note that the positive role of smoothing is not generalizable to all types of smoothing, but 
rather is applicable to smoothing under certain conditions.11 We contribute to the debate about 
                                                 
9 Other studies that support a role of smoothing in enhancing relevance include Subramanyam (1996), Liu, Ryan, 
and Wahlen (1997), Barth et al. (1999), Francis et al. (2004), Tucker and Zarowin (2006), and Das, Shroff, and 
Zhang (2009). 
10 In addition, Hunt, Moyer, and Shevlin (2000) document that smoothing is associated with a stronger price-
earnings relation. Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) develop a theoretical model in which tighter accounting standards 
reduce noise in reported earnings, thus decreasing the variability of reported earnings and increasing their value 
relevance (i.e., the earnings-return relation).  
11 For example, Cahan, Liu, and Sun (2008) and Amiram and Owens (2018) find evidence that smoothing is 
beneficial only in countries with strong investor protection. The analytical model in Sankar and Subramanyam 
(2001) also underscores the importance of formal mechanisms that restrict managers’ reporting discretion in 
determining the usefulness of income smoothing.  
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the appropriate financial reporting model by providing evidence about whether smoothing by 
high ability managers versus low ability managers improves earnings usefulness. 
 
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data 
Our initial sample includes firm-years from the intersection of the Compustat and CRSP 
databases for the years 1991-2011 after excluding financial services and utilities firms.12 We 
exclude firm-years with M&A activity in excess of five percent of lagged assets, as major 
acquisition activity could unduly affect both managerial ability and income smoothing 
(McNichols 2002; Demerjian et al. 2013).13  After requiring data to compute the regression 
variables, our final sample consists of 43,322 firm-year observations. To mitigate the effect of 
outliers, we winsorize variables at the 1% and 99% levels.  
Managerial Ability Measure 
To measure managerial ability for each firm, we use a DEA-based method developed by 
Demerjian et al. (2012). DEA is a nonparametric method that measures the relative efficiency of 
decision making units (DMUs). DEA uses linear programming to create an efficient frontier of 
observed production points to maximize a ratio of outputs to inputs. DEA assigns a value of one 
to the most efficient DMUs, which are on the frontier, and values of less than one to inefficient 
DMUs. Thus, the DEA technique assigns efficiency scores for inefficient units based on the 
distance of the DMU from the frontier (see Online Appendix A for more details). The DEA score 
                                                 
12 Our sample begins in 1991 because we require at least three observations for changes in cash flows for SMTH2 
and the Statement of Cash Flows became widely available in 1988. We use data through 2015 but the final sample 
period stops in 2011 to ensure a sufficient period to calculate our future smoothing measure (SMTHt, t+4).  
13 We re-estimate our models without this filter, leaving inferences unchanged.  
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represents how efficiently a firm’s management team utilizes available corporate resources to 
maximize outputs (Baik, Chae, Choi, and Farber 2013).  
The DEA-based measure of managerial ability has several advantages over other 
measures of managerial ability frequently used in the literature. First, it is a manager-specific 
measure, while other measures are usually firm-specific (e.g., past abnormal performance). 
Demerjian et al. (2012) support the DEA-based measure by showing that it is more attributable 
to manager effects than to firm effects. Demerjian et al. (2012) further find that the manager-
specific component of the DEA-based measure is greater than that of alternative measures such 
as compensation and industry-adjusted ROA. Second, it is measured directly from actual firm 
performance reflected in financial statements, rather than relying on the perceived managerial 
ability by outsiders (e.g., media citations, CEO awards). For example, media citations are often 
criticized as not being significantly associated with firm performance as well as being biased due 
to the media’s own incentives (LaFond 2008). Finally, the DEA-based ability measure is directly 
linked to a firm’s goal of maximizing profits.14 
We follow the two-step procedure from Demerjian et al. (2012) to obtain a manager-
level DEA score. In the first step, we obtain a measure of efficiency by solving an optimization 
problem (using DEA) that maximizes an output variable based on seven input variables. We use 
sales revenue as our sole output variable and use the following seven input variables: (i) net 
property, plant, and equipment (PP&E), (ii) cost of goods sold (COGS), (iii) selling, general, and 
administrative costs (SG&A), (iv) capitalized operating leases, (v) net research and development 
(R&D) costs, (vi) purchased goodwill, and (vii) other intangible assets. The efficiency score 
                                                 
14 It is important to note that the ability measure we employ reflects only one aspect of managerial ability, the ability 
to generate higher revenues from a given set of inputs. Our measure does not capture other potential aspects of 
managerial ability, such as innovation and the development of new products and business models for long-term 
sustainable growth.  
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from the optimization procedure includes both manager and firm characteristics. To arrive at our 
measure of managerial ability, we estimate the following Tobit model (by industry) to purge 
firm-level characteristics:  
      Firm Efficiencyt = α0 + α1 Firm sizet + α2 Market sharet + α3 Positive free cash flowt  
+ α4 Aget + α5 Business segment concentrationt + α6 Foreign currency indicatort 
+∑t Yeart  + εt          (1) 
     
The dependent variable in Equation (1) is firm efficiency derived from DEA, measured 
between zero and one. Control variables are designed to capture firm-level characteristics that 
can affect firm efficiency. We provide definitions of the variables in Appendix I. The residual 
from Equation (1) is our main measure of managerial ability, which Demerjian et al. (2012) 
attribute to the management team.15 Following Demerjian et al. (2013), we decile rank the 
residual by year and industry to create our measure of managerial ability, MA-Score.  
Income Smoothing Measures 
We combine three commonly used measures of income smoothing to mitigate 
measurement error (Leuz et al. 2003; Tucker and Zarowin 2006; Dou et al. 2013). Our aggregate 
income smoothing measure (SMTH) is the common factor identified from a factor analysis of 
SMTH1, SMTH2, and SMTH3. SMTH1 is the standard deviation of operating earnings divided by 
the standard deviation of cash flows from operations, where earnings and cash flows are scaled 
by lagged total assets (Leuz et al. 2003; Dou et al. 2013). The intuition for SMTH1 is that 
earnings will be smoother (i.e., earnings are less volatile) than cash flows from operations (i.e., 
underlying volatility of a firm’s operations) if managers smooth reported earnings. SMTH2 is the 
                                                 
15 We assess the robustness of our main findings using a number of alternative measures of managerial ability: (i) 
historical industry-adjusted stock returns, (ii) historical industry-adjusted ROA (e.g., Rajgopal, Shevlin, and Zamora 
2006; Demerjian et al. 2012), and (iii) CEO awards given by various business journals such as Business Week and 
Forbes over the prior five years (Malmendier and Tate 2009). Untabulated results using these alternative measures 
of managerial ability are largely consistent with our main findings. 
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Spearman correlation between the change in total accruals and the change in cash flows from 
operations (both scaled by lagged total assets). This measure captures the extent to which 
managers use accruals to smooth reported earnings in response to shocks to a firm’s economic 
performance (i.e., operating cash flows). SMTH3 is the Spearman correlation between the change 
in discretionary accruals and the change in pre-managed income (Tucker and Zarowin 2006). We 
estimate discretionary accruals from the cross-sectional version of the Jones (1991) model. We 
calculate pre-managed income as net income minus discretionary accruals. This measure 
assumes that managers use discretionary accruals to smooth reported earnings. In estimating the 
three individual income smoothing measures, the standard deviations or the Spearman 
correlations are calculated over at least three of the five years and are multiplied by negative one 
so that larger values represent more income smoothing.  
Empirical Models  
To test our first hypothesis on the relation between managerial ability and smoothing 
(H1), we estimate the following regression, which is based on a model in Lang et al. (2012): 
SMTHt,t+4 = β0 + β1 MA-Scoret + β2 Firm sizet + β3 Leveraget + β4 BM ratiot  
+ β5 Sales volatilityt + β6 Loss%t + β7 Operating cyclet + β8 Sales growtht  
+ β9 Operating leveraget + β10 Avg CFOt + Firm and Year Fixed Effects + εt (2)  
 
SMTHt,t+4 is the aggregated measure of income smoothing over t through t+4. MA-Scoret 
is the decile rank by industry and year of managerial ability based on the residual from Equation 
(1). Consistent with the literature on managerial ability and earnings quality (Francis, Huang, 
Rajgopal, and Zang 2008; Demerjian et al. 2013), we examine the relation between managerial 
ability at time t and income smoothing in the future (t, t+4) to address concerns about the 
direction of causality. The coefficient on MA-Score (β1) captures the effect of managerial ability 
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on income smoothing after controlling for fundamental firm characteristics associated with 
income smoothing. Based on our arguments for H1, we predict the sign on β1 to be positive.  
We also include several variables to control for fundamental features of the firm’s 
operating environment and determinants of income smoothing (Lang et al. 2012). We control for 
firm size, leverage, book-to-market ratio, sales volatility, the frequency of reporting losses, 
operating cycle, sales growth, operating leverage, and average cash flows. We present detailed 
definitions of the control variables in Appendix I. Finally, we also include firm and year fixed 
effects to control for time-invariant firm characteristics and variation across years. 
To test our hypothesis about whether smoothing by high ability managers improves 
earnings informativeness about future performance more than smoothing by low ability 
managers (H2), we estimate the following OLS regression:  
CFOt+1 = γ0 + γ1 Et + γ2 CFOt-1 + γ3 SMTHt-4, t + γ4 SMTHt-4, t×Et + γ5 SMTHt-4, t×CFOt-1  
+ γ6 HighAbt + γ7 Et×HighAbt + γ8 CFOt-1×HighAbt + γ9 SMTHt-4, t×HighAbt  
+ γ10 SMTHt-4, t×Et×HighAbt + γ11 SMTHt-4, t×CFOt-1×HighAbt  
+ Firm and Year Fixed Effects + εt       (3) 
 
The dependent variable, CFOt+1 , is one-year-ahead cash flows from operations, deflated 
by lagged total assets. We use future cash flows, rather than future earnings, as the dependent 
variable to ensure that our results are not driven by the possibility that smoothed future earnings 
are simply more predictable. If future earnings are more predictable, then the effect of smoothing 
on earnings informativeness could be related to properties of future earnings rather than to the 
informativeness of current earnings. We address this concern by focusing on future cash flows, 
which are independent of properties of future earnings.16 Et is earnings before extraordinary 
items for year t, deflated by lagged total assets. We follow Ball and Shivakumar (2006) and 
                                                 
16 We are grateful to the editor for insightful comments on this issue. 
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include prior-period cash flows (CFOt-1) to control for expected cash flows at the beginning of 
year t.17 SMTHt-4, t is the aggregated measure of income smoothing measured from years t-4 to t. 
For ease of interpretation, we use the percentile rank of SMTHt-4, t, which takes a value between 
zero and one.18 HighAbt equals one if MA-Scoret is above its median value, and zero otherwise. 
If smoothing improves the extent to which current earnings anticipate future cash flows, 
then we predict a positive coefficient on the interaction between current earnings and smoothing 
(SMTHt-4,t×Et).19 Because we expect high ability managers to incorporate more forward-looking 
information (i.e., future cash flows) into current earnings through smoothing than low ability 
managers, we predict a positive sign on γ10, our coefficient of interest.  
 To test our hypothesis (H3) about whether smoothing by high ability managers enhances 
stock price informativeness about future performance more than smoothing by low ability 
managers, we modify a future earnings response coefficient (FERC) model (e.g., Collins et al. 
1994; Lundholm and Myers 2002; Choi, Myers, Zang, and Ziebart 2011) by decomposing 
earnings into accruals and cash flows. We further include interactions with income smoothing 
and managerial ability (Tucker and Zarowin 2006). We estimate the following OLS regression:  
                                                 
17 Our inferences do not change when we exclude CFOt-1 from the model or when we replace CFOt-1 with Et-1 
(untabulated).  
18  Our inferences are not affected when we use the continuous value of SMTHt-4, t in Equations (3) and (4) 
(untabulated). 
19 We predict a positive coefficient on SMTHt-4,t×Et when managerial ability and its interactions are not included in 
the regression (i.e., average effect of smoothing on earnings informativeness). Note that when managerial ability and 
its interactions are in the model, the coefficient on SMTHt-4,t×Et reflects the effect of smoothing by low ability 
managers on earnings informativeness and its sign is expected to be negative if smoothing by low ability managers 
adds noise to reported earnings.  
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Rt = δ0 + δ1 XACt-1 + δ2 XACt + δ3 XACt+1 + δ4 XCFt-1 + δ5 XCFt + δ6 XCFt+1 +δ7 Rt+1  
+ δ8 SMTHt-4, t + δ9 SMTHt-4, t×XACt-1 + δ10 SMTHt-4, t×XACt+ δ11 SMTHt-4, t×XACt+1  
+ δ12 SMTHt-4, t×XCFt-1 + δ13 SMTHt-4, t×XCFt+ δ14 SMTHt-4, t×XCFt+1  
+ δ15 SMTHt-4, t×Rt+1 + δ16 HighAbt + δ17 XACt-1×HighAbt + δ18 XACt×HighAbt  
+ δ19 XACt+1×HighAbt + δ20 XCFt-1×HighAbt + δ21 XCFt×HighAbt  
+ δ22 XCFt+1×HighAbt+ δ23 Rt+1×HighAbt + δ24 SMTHt-4, t×HighAbt  
+ δ25 SMTHt-4, t×XACt-1×HighAbt + δ26 SMTHt-4, t×XACt×HighAbt  
+ δ27  SMTHt-4, t×XACt+1×HighAbt + δ28 SMTHt-4, t×XCFt-1×HighAbt  
+ δ29 SMTHt-4,t×XCFt×HighAbt + δ30 SMTHt-4,t×XCFt+1×HighAbt  
+ δ31 SMTHt-4, t×Rt+1×HighAbt + Control variables and their interactions  
+ Firm and Year Fixed Effects + εt       (4) 
 
Rt is the cumulative buy-and-hold return for the fiscal year, XACt and XCFt are accruals 
and operating cash flows for year t, respectively, scaled by beginning of year market value of 
equity.20 Rt+1 (future returns) is the cumulative buy-and-hold return for year t+1 and is included 
to control for the measurement error generated by events occurring in the future that affect 
XCFt+1 but were not anticipated at the end of year t (Collins et al. 1994). As before, we use the 
percentile rank of SMTHt-4, t and an indicator variable for managerial ability (HighAbt) based on 
its median value. We also note that some firm characteristics and aspects of firms’ information 
environment can affect stock price informativeness. To address this issue, we include in the 
regressions firm size, earnings volatility, the number of analysts following the firm, institutional 
holdings, as well as their interactions.21  
When we use future earnings as a measure of future performance in a regression with 
current stock returns as the dependent variable, the coefficient on future earnings captures the 
ability of current stock returns to reflect the information about future earnings, commonly called 
                                                 
20 In Equation (4), we deflate accruals and cash flows by market value of equity, rather than by total assets as in 
Equation (3), to be consistent with prior studies on FERCs (Tucker and Zarowin 2006) and because the dependent 
variable (i.e., returns) is essentially market value changes deflated by beginning market value. As an alternative 
specification, we use lagged total assets as a deflator in Equation (4), leaving inferences unchanged (untabulated).  
21 In untabulated results, we also include an indicator variable for management forecasts and find similar results to 
those reported.  
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the future earnings response coefficient (FERC). This measure is widely used as a proxy for 
stock price informativeness.22 For example, Tucker and Zarowin (2006) show that stock returns 
of firms with smoother earnings contain more information about future earnings than stock 
returns of firms with less smooth earnings (i.e., there is a positive coefficient on the interaction 
between future earnings and income smoothing), implying that smoothing improves stock price 
informativeness about future earnings. While earnings is an important summary performance 
measure, predicting future cash flows is the main task in equity valuation. Furthermore, focusing 
on future cash flows, rather than on future earnings, enables us to address the possibility that 
future earnings are simply more predictable when earnings are smoothed. As a result, we focus 
on the coefficients on future cash flows and their interactions, consistent with our approach in 
Equation (3). Therefore, our variable of interest is the coefficient on the three-way interaction 
among future cash flows, smoothing, and managerial ability (δ30), since this coefficient directly 
captures the channel through which smoothing by high ability managers impacts stock price 
informativeness about future cash flows. We predict a positive sign on δ30 (H3).  
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
 In Panel A of Table 1, we provide descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
regression tests based on the full sample. The mean (median) of MA-Score is 0.502 (0.556). 
Panel B of Table 1 presents the mean values of the variables separately for firms with high and 
low ability managers. All of the aggregated measures of smoothing (i.e., SMTHt,t+4, SMTHt-4,t) 
                                                 
22 See, for example, Collins et al. (1994), Lundholm and Myers (2002), Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin 
(2003), Tucker and Zarowin (2006), and Fernandes and Ferreira (2009). 
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are significantly greater for the high ability group than for the low ability group, providing 
univariate evidence consistent with H1, in which we predict a positive relation between 
smoothing and managerial ability. Firms with high ability managers are characterized by smaller 
size (Firm size), higher growth (Sales growth, BM ratio), more volatile business (Sales 
volatility), and higher firm performance (Avg CFO, Loss%, Et, and Rt).  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 Table 2 provides correlations between our smoothing and ability measures. Our primary 
measure of managerial ability, MA-Score, is positively and significantly related to each of our 
measures of smoothing, consistent with the results in Panel B of Table 1. Similar to the results in 
Demerjian et al. (2012), we report that MA-Score is positively related to the alternative measures 
of ability (i.e., historical industry-adjusted stock returns and historical industry-adjusted ROA). 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Regression Results for the Relation between Managerial Ability and Smoothing 
 We provide tests of our hypothesis about the relation between smoothing and managerial 
ability (H1) in Table 3. We report a positive and significant coefficient on MA-Score (0.082; t = 
4.25), even after controlling for several fundamental firm characteristics that may affect 
smoothing, and firm and year fixed effects.23 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 Results in Table 3 are consistent with the notion that high ability managers use their 
discretion to make accounting choices that dampen earnings fluctuations. We next assess the 
                                                 
23 While our main results are reported using firm fixed effects, results are similar when we use standard errors 
clustered by firm to control for serial correlations in the residual. As alternative ways to control for serial 
correlations, we also use (i) the Newey-West procedure with 4 lags and (ii) the method suggested by Hjalmarsson 
(2011), in which OLS t-statistics are divided by the square root of the horizon to correct for the effect of a dependent 
variable measured with overlapping observations (i.e., SMTHt,t+4). We find that inferences are unchanged using 
these approaches.  
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impact of smoothing by high ability managers on earnings informativeness about future 
performance (H2). 
Regression Results for the Impact of Smoothing by High Ability Managers on Earnings 
Informativeness 
 
 In Table 4, we report results for tests of the hypothesis that smoothing by high ability 
managers improves earnings informativeness more than smoothing by low ability managers 
(H2). In column 1 of Panel A, we present results without smoothing, managerial ability, and their 
interactions. The coefficients on current earnings and lagged cash flows are both positive and 
significant. When we include the interactions with smoothing in column 2, we find that the 
coefficient on the interaction between smoothing and current earnings (SMTHt-4, t×Et) is positive 
and significant (0.075; t = 3.54), indicating that smoothing improves the ability of current 
earnings to predict future cash flows. More importantly, when the interactions with an indicator 
variable for high ability managers (HighAbt) are included in the model in column 3, the 
coefficient on SMTHt-4, t×Et×HighAbt is significantly positive (0.274; t = 6.43), suggesting that 
smoothing by high ability managers improves the informativeness of current earnings about 
future cash flows. In contrast, the coefficient on SMTHt-4,t×Et, which captures the effect of 
smoothing on earnings informativeness for low ability managers, is negative and significant (-
0.053; t = -1.90), suggesting that smoothing by low ability managers reduces earnings 
informativeness. Our finding of the contrasting impact of smoothing by high versus low ability 
managers on earnings informativeness highlights the importance of considering managerial 
characteristics in assessing the usefulness of smoothing.  
 To assess the economic significance of the results in Panel A, we calculate the estimated 
coefficient on current earnings (Et) across high and low levels of managerial ability and 
smoothing by using the lowest and highest values of HighAbt (i.e., 0/1) and the lowest and 
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highest values of SMTHt-4, t (i.e., 0/1) along with the estimated coefficients in column 3 of Panel 
A.24 As presented in Panel B, the calculated coefficient on Et is 0.345 for low ability/low 
smoothing, 0.292 (=0.345-0.053) for low ability/high smoothing, 0.325 (=0.345-0.020) for high 
ability/low smoothing, and 0.546 (=0.345-0.053-0.020+0.274) for high ability/high smoothing, 
respectively. Therefore, high ability managers increase the relation between current earnings and 
future cash flows (i.e., the coefficient on Et) by 0.221 (i.e., 68%) through smoothing, while low 
ability managers reduce this relation by 0.053 (i.e., 15%). At the highest value of smoothing, the 
magnitude of the relation between current earnings and future cash flows for high ability 
managers (0.546) is about 87% greater than that for low ability managers (0.292). Taken 
together, the results suggest that smoothing is an important channel through which high ability 
managers communicate their private information about future cash flows. 
To address the possibility that degrees of income smoothing are determined not only by 
managerial discretion but also by the firm’s fundamental characteristics (e.g., operating 
environment and business strategy),25 we follow Lang et al. (2012) and decompose smoothing 
into its fundamental and discretionary components. When we replace smoothing with its 
discretionary and fundamental components, we find that while both aspects of smoothing 
enhance the ability of current earnings to predict future cash flows, discretionary smoothing 
provides more information. Please see Online Appendix B for more details about the estimation 
of the discretionary and fundamental smoothing components, and related empirical results. 
                                                 
24 It is possible that our results are driven by clustered observations in the low ability/low smoothing group and high 
ability/high smoothing group. In untabulated results, we find that the number of observations for the low ability/low 
smoothing (low ability/high smoothing) group is 11,510 (9,973), and 10,146 (11,693) for the high ability/low 
smoothing (high ability/high smoothing) group. Clustering does not therefore appear to be an issue for our results. 
25 We note that our smoothing measures adopted from prior studies (e.g., SMTH1, SMTH2) capture the smoothness 
of accruals relative to underlying operating performance reflected in cash flows (Leuz et al. 2003; Dou et al. 2013). 
However, firm characteristics such as size and business volatility can also impact smoothing. We therefore explicitly 
include controls for these characteristics to obtain measures of fundamental and discretionary smoothing.  
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Overall, results in Table 4 support our second hypothesis that smoothing by high ability 
managers improves earnings informativeness more than smoothing by low ability managers.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
   
Regression Results for the Impact of Smoothing by High Ability Managers on Stock Price 
Informativeness 
 
 In this section, we test our hypothesis that smoothing by high ability managers improves 
stock price informativeness more than smoothing by low ability managers (H3). We report 
results in Panel A of Table 5. We present a baseline model in column 1. The coefficients on 
current cash flows (XCFt) and future cash flows (XCFt+1) are significantly positive, while the 
coefficients on lagged cash flows (XCFt-1) and future returns (Rt+1) are significantly negative, 
consistent with results in prior studies (e.g., Lundholm and Myers 2002; Tucker and Zarowin 
2006).26 In column 2, we report a negative and significant coefficient on the interaction between 
our smoothing measure and future cash flows (SMTHt-4, t×XCFt+1), while the coefficient on the 
interaction between our smoothing measure and future accruals (SMTHt-4, t×XACt+1) is positive 
and significant.27 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 In column 3 of Panel A, we report a positive and significant coefficient of 0.256 (t = 
2.24) on the interaction term SMTHt-4,t×XCFt+1×HighAbt, implying that stock prices better 
anticipate future cash flows when high ability managers report smoother earnings. In contrast, 
                                                 
26 For brevity, we do not report the results for the control variables (i.e., firm size, earnings volatility, the number of 
analysts, and institutional holdings) and their interactions; untabulated results are generally consistent with prior 
research. Specifically, stock price informativeness is higher (lower) for large firms and firms with high institutional 
holdings (firms with high earnings volatility). The coefficient on the interaction between future earnings and the 
number of analysts is insignificant when other control variables are included, but is positive and significant when 
other control variables are not included in the model. 
27 When we use one-year-ahead earnings (instead of accruals and cash flows), the sign on the coefficient of the 
interaction between smoothing and future earnings is positive and significant, which is consistent with Tucker and 
Zarowin (2006).  
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the coefficient on SMTHt-4,t×XCFt+1 is negative and significant (-0.261; t = -3.07), indicating that 
smoothing by low ability managers reduces the ability of stock prices to anticipate future cash 
flows. To assess the economic significance of these results, in Panel B, we present the estimated 
coefficient on future cash flows (CFOt+1) across high and low values of managerial ability and 
smoothing by using the lowest and highest values of HighAbt (i.e., 0/1) and the lowest and 
highest values of SMTHt-4, t (i.e., 0/1) along with the estimated coefficients in column 3 of Panel 
A. At the lowest value of smoothing, the difference in stock price informativeness between high 
and low ability managers (0.016) is not significant, while the difference (0.272) is significant at 
the highest value of smoothing. When total smoothing moves from the lowest to the highest 
value, low ability managers reduce stock price informativeness by 0.261 (i.e., 120%), while the 
change (-0.005) for high ability managers is not different from zero.  
Similar to our earnings informativeness tests, we also replace total smoothing with 
fundamental smoothing and discretionary smoothing to examine their impact on stock price 
informativeness.  We find that that discretionary smoothing is more useful to equity investors 
and that fundamental smoothing is less useful. Please see Online Appendix B for details. 
 To provide corroborating evidence about the impact of smoothing by high ability 
managers on stock price informativeness, we follow Muslu et al. (2015) and use short-window 
returns over the earnings announcement period and non-earnings announcement period and re-
run the stock price informativeness test (i.e., Equation (4)).28 To the extent that current earnings 
help investors to better predict future performance, we predict that our findings are more likely to 
arise from short-window returns around the earnings announcement of year t earnings because 
information about current earnings becomes available from earnings announcements. We report 
                                                 
28 We thank the editor for suggesting this test. 
30 
 
 
the results in Panel C of Table 5. When we measure stock returns over the 30-day period that 
starts 10 days before and ends 20 days after the annual earnings announcement date, we find that 
the three-way interaction among smoothing, managerial ability, and future cash flows is positive 
and significant, as reported in column 1. In contrast, when we measure stock returns over the 30-
day period before the earnings announcement date, the three-way interaction in column 2 is 
insignificant. Results from the short-window tests reinforce the notion that smoothing by high 
ability managers helps investors better predict future performance. Overall, results in Table 5 
suggest that high ability managers use smoothing to communicate their assessment of future 
performance and that investors value this information. 29, 30 
Additional Tests 
 
We perform several additional tests that leave our main inferences unchanged. We briefly 
describe the tests here and refer the reader to Online Appendix C for details.   
• We re-estimate our models using a constant management team to ensure that our results 
are due to the management team, rather than to firm-specific characteristics. 
 
• We assess endogeneity by utilizing within-firm variation in managerial ability and again 
find that our inferences are qualitatively similar to our main results. Notwithstanding our 
tests for endogeneity, we cannot completely rule out endogeneity. 
 
• We investigate whether cross-sectional differences in firms’ information asymmetry 
influence high ability managers’ use of smoothing to signal their private information.31 
We find that the relation between smoothing and managerial ability is more pronounced 
for firms with higher information asymmetry. Moreover, the effects of smoothing by high 
ability managers are stronger for firms with higher levels of information asymmetry. 
 
                                                 
29 In untabulated analyses, we run the regression using the sum of cash flows for years t+1 to t+3 as a measure of 
future cash flows and find similar results. Additionally, when we use one-year-ahead earnings (instead of accruals 
and cash flows) or the sum of earnings for years t+1 to t+3, inferences are not affected.  
30  It is possible that high ability managers signal their private information using real earnings management 
(Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen and Zarowin 2010). However, real earnings management is also potentially costly 
given that high ability managers have superior operational skills and that the cost of sacrificing future firm growth 
by reducing investments in R&D, for example, might outweigh the benefit of doing so.  
31 Signaling was originally developed as a mechanism to mitigate information asymmetry (Spence 1973). 
31 
 
 
• We assess the sensitivity of our results based on whether firms employ other signaling 
channels. We find that smoothing by high ability managers is more pronounced for firms 
with fewer other signaling channels. 
 
• Finally, as an alternative test of our earnings informativeness hypothesis, we estimate a 
modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model and find that smoothing by high ability 
managers improves earnings informativeness. 
 
 
  
 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
We investigate whether high ability managers smooth income more than low ability 
managers and whether smoothing by high ability managers improves the informativeness of 
earnings and stock prices about future performance more than smoothing by low ability 
managers. Using a large sample of U.S. firms for the period 1991-2011, we find that managerial 
ability is positively related to income smoothing, even after controlling for other determinants of 
income smoothing. 
To the extent that high ability managers have superior skills in assessing their firms’ 
future performance, we expect that their income smoothing will make earnings and stock prices 
more informative about future performance. We find evidence that high ability managers are 
more likely to smooth earnings to embed forward-looking information in current earnings, thus 
improving earnings informativeness. We also find that smoothing by high ability managers 
increases stock price informativeness about future cash flows. We also conduct short-window 
tests to corroborate the stock price informativeness tests. Endogeneity is an issue in our setting 
and we attempt to mitigate concerns about this issue by re-running our tests using a constant 
management team and within-firm variation in managerial ability. Additional tests reveal that 
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smoothing is useful when used by higher ability managers in firms with high information 
asymmetry and in firms with fewer alternative signaling channels. We also assess the robustness 
of our earnings informativeness tests using a modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. Taken 
together, our findings are consistent with the view that high ability managers use their superior 
skills to anticipate changes in their firms’ economic prospects and use smoothing to 
communicate their private information.  
Our findings are subject to several caveats. We acknowledge that our inferences depend 
on the validity of our empirical measure of managerial ability because managerial ability is 
unobservable and thus difficult to measure. We also acknowledge that we cannot rule out 
endogeneity in our study. Despite these limitations, our findings provide important insights into 
the determinants and usefulness of smoothing. 
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Appendix I 
Definitions of Variables 
 
Variable  Definition 
Firm efficiency Firm efficiency based on Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) using seven inputs and 
one output: 
• Inputs: net PP&E (PPENT) at the beginning of the fiscal year; cost of goods 
sold (COGS); selling, general, and administrative expenses (XSGA), 
capitalized operating leases calculated as the discount present value of the 
next five years of required operating lease payments (MRC1-MRC5) using 
a discount rate of 10 percent; capitalized R&D costs, calculated following 
Lev and Sougiannis (1996); purchased goodwill (GDWL); and other 
acquired and capitalized intangibles (INTAN- GDWL).  
• Output: revenues (SALE)  
 
MA-Score The decile rank (by industry and year) of managerial efficiency (the residual from 
Equation (1)), with a value between 0 and 1. 
 
Firm size The natural log of the firm’s assets (AT) at the end of year t. 
  
Market share The percentage of revenues (SALE) of the firm by Fama-French industry in year t. 
 
Positive free cash flow An indicator variable that equals one when a firm has non-negative free cash flows 
(OANCF-CAPX), and zero otherwise. 
 
Age The natural log of the number of years since the firm was first covered by Compustat.  
 
Business Segment 
Concentration 
The sum of the squares of each segment’s sales in year t as a percentage of total firm 
sales. If the firm is not in the segment file, it is assigned a concentration of one. 
 
Foreign currency 
 Indicator 
An indicator variable that equals one when a firm reports a non-zero value for foreign 
currency adjustment (FCA) in year t, and zero otherwise.  
 
SMTH1t,t+4 (t-4, t) The standard deviation of operating earnings (OIADP) divided by the standard 
deviation of cash flows from operations (OANCF), where earnings and cash flows are 
scaled by lagged total assets. The standard deviation is calculated over at least three of 
the five years (t, t+4) for SMTH1t,t+4 and (t-4, t) for SMTH1t-4, t. For easier 
interpretation, SMTH1 is multiplied by negative one. 
 
SMTH2t,t+4 (t-4, t) The Spearman correlation between the change in total accruals (IB-OANCF) and the 
change in cash flows from operations (OANCF) (both scaled by lagged total assets). 
The correlation is calculated over at least three of the five years (t, t+4) for SMTH2t,t+4 
and (t-4, t) for SMTH2t-4, t. For easier interpretation, SMTH2 is multiplied by negative 
one. 
 
SMTH3t,t+4 (t-4, t) The Spearman correlation between the change in discretionary accruals and the 
change in pre-managed income. Discretionary accruals are estimated from the cross-
sectional version of the Jones model. Pre-managed income is calculated as net income 
minus discretionary accruals. The correlation is calculated over at least three of the 
five years (t, t+4) for SMTH3t,t+4 and (t-4, t) for SMTH3t-4, t. For easier interpretation, 
SMTH3 is multiplied by negative one. 
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SMTHt,t+4 (t-4, t) 
 
The common factor identified by factor analysis on the three measures of income 
smoothing: SMTH1t,t+4 (t-4, t), SMTH2t,t+4 (t-4, t), and SMTH3t,t+4 (t-4, t). 
 
Leverage Leverage, defined as total liabilities (LT) divided by total assets (AT). 
 
BM ratio Book-to-market ratio, defined as the natural log of book value of equity (CEQ) 
divided by market value of equity (PRCC_F×CSHO). 
 
Sales volatility The standard deviation of sales (SALE) scaled by lagged total assets (AT), over at 
least three of the last five years (t-4, t). 
 
Loss% The percentage of years reporting losses in net income (IB) over at least three of the 
last five years (t-4, t). 
 
Operating cycle The natural log of the length of the firm’s operating cycle: (Sale/360)/(average 
accounts receivable (RECT)) + (COGS/360)/(average Inventory (INVT)) and is 
averaged over at least three of the last five years (t-4, t). 
 
Sales growth The annual change in revenues defined as (Salest-Salest-1)/Salest-1. 
 
Operating leverage Net property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) divided by total assets (AT). 
 
AvgCFO Average cash flows from operations (OANCF) scaled by lagged total assets, 
measured over the last five years (t-4, t). 
 
Et Income before extraordinary items (IB) for year t, deflated by lagged total assets. 
 
CFOt Operating cash flows (OANCF) for year t, deflated by lagged total assets. 
 
Rt The cumulative buy-and-hold return for fiscal year t.  
 
XACt Accruals (IB-OANCF) for year t, deflated by lagged market value of equity  
 
XCFt Operating cash flows (OANCF) for year t, deflated by lagged market value of equity 
  
Historical returns Five-year historical value-weighted industry-adjusted stock returns over years t-4 to t. 
 
Historical ROA Five-year historical average of industry-adjusted ROA over years t-4 to t, where ROA 
is net income (IB) scaled by lagged total assets (AT). 
 
 
Compustat XPF names are presented in the parentheses. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics  
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics for the full sample (N = 43,322) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3
Firm efficiency 0.519 0.244 0.333 0.547 0.709 
MA-Score 0.502 0.315 0.222 0.556 0.778 
SMTHt,t+4 0.000 1.000 -0.487 0.312 0.747 
SMTHt-4,t 0.000 1.000 -0.474 0.319 0.742 
Firm size 5.512 2.147 3.898 5.396 6.963 
Leverage 0.453 0.210 0.285 0.454 0.607 
BM ratio -0.581 0.925 -1.137 -0.581 -0.043 
Sales volatility 0.313 0.338 0.112 0.207 0.381 
Loss% 0.279 0.322 0.000 0.200 0.400 
Operating cycle 4.714 0.730 4.359 4.790 5.171 
Sales growth 0.108 0.361 -0.036 0.067 0.188 
Operating leverage 0.281 0.226 0.103 0.215 0.402 
AvgCFO 0.068 0.150 0.031 0.085 0.138 
Et 0.012 0.168 -0.018 0.039 0.089 
CFOt 0.074 0.149 0.022 0.084 0.147 
CFOt+1 0.084 0.183 0.021 0.089 0.160 
CFOt-1 0.063 0.140 0.020 0.080 0.135 
XCFt-1 0.122 0.315 0.020 0.079 0.160 
XACt-1 -0.147 0.403 -0.145 -0.047 -0.006 
XCFt 0.139 0.326 0.022 0.085 0.173 
XACt -0.134 0.335 -0.152 -0.052 -0.008 
XCFt+1 0.149 0.353 0.023 0.091 0.186 
XACt+1 -0.127 0.326 -0.152 -0.056 -0.010 
Rt 0.187 0.747 -0.236 0.056 0.392 
Rt+1 0.174 0.719 -0.228 0.056 0.375 
Historical ROA 0.398 0.782 0.064 0.162 0.408 
Historical returns 0.050 1.927 -0.875 -0.280 0.473 
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TABLE 1 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B. Means of the variables across high and low managerial ability 
 
High Ability 
Managers 
(N = 21,839)
Low Ability 
Managers 
(N = 21,483)
Difference 
 
Variable Mean Mean
Firm efficiency 0.598 0.438 0.161*** 
MA-Score 0.773 0.225 0.548*** 
SMTHt,t+4 0.077 -0.078 0.155*** 
SMTHt-4,t 0.078 -0.080 0.158*** 
Firm size 5.467 5.558 -0.091*** 
Leverage 0.446 0.461 -0.016*** 
BM ratio -0.633 -0.527 -0.106*** 
Sales volatility 0.338 0.288 0.050*** 
Loss% 0.223 0.335 -0.112*** 
Operating cycle 4.667 4.762 -0.096*** 
Sales growth 0.146 0.069 0.077*** 
Operating leverage 0.274 0.288 -0.014*** 
AvgCFO 0.087 0.048 0.039*** 
Et 0.054 -0.030 0.084*** 
CFOt 0.097 0.050 0.047*** 
CFOt+1 0.112 0.055 0.057*** 
CFOt-1 0.085 0.041 0.043*** 
XCFt-1 0.135 0.108 0.027*** 
XACt-1 -0.126 -0.168 0.043*** 
XCFt 0.149 0.128 0.021*** 
XACt -0.103 -0.165 0.063*** 
XCFt+1 0.168 0.130 0.039*** 
XACt+1 -0.114 -0.140 0.026*** 
Rt 0.236 0.137 0.099*** 
Rt+1 0.174 0.175 0.000 
Historical ROA 0.429 0.367 0.062*** 
Historical returns 0.314 -0.218 0.532*** 
 
Panel A of the table reports descriptive statistics for variables used in our analysis for the full sample. Panel B 
summarizes the mean value of each variable separately for high and low ability groups. The sample is partitioned 
into high and low ability managers based on the median of MA-Score. The sample is comprised of 43,322 
observations for the years 1991 to 2011. *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level. See Appendix I for the 
definitions of the variables. 
41 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Correlations between Smoothing and Managerial Ability 
 
 SMTHt,t+4 SMTHt-4,t Historical ROA Historical returns 
MA-Score 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.24*** 0.21*** 
 (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)
SMTHt,t+4  0.33*** 0.18*** 0.12*** 
  (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)
SMTHt-4,t   0.23*** 0.16*** 
   (<0.01) (<0.01)
Historical ROA    0.47***
    (<0.01)
 
This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between MA-Score, measures of income smoothing, and 
alternative measures of managerial ability. The sample is comprised of 43,322 observations for the years 1991 to 
2011. *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level. See Appendix I for the definitions of the variables. 
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TABLE 3 
Impact of Managerial Ability on Smoothing 
 
 Dependent variable = SMTHt,t+4 
 (1) 
 Coefficients t-value 
MA-Score 0.082*** (4.25) 
Firm size -0.061*** (-6.71) 
Leverage 0.108*** (3.05) 
BM ratio 0.006 (0.79) 
Sales volatility -0.083*** (-4.73) 
Loss% -0.186*** (-7.65) 
Operating cycle -0.094*** (-4.67) 
Sales growth -0.023** (-1.97) 
Operating leverage -0.155*** (-2.80) 
AvgCFO 0.163*** (2.90) 
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Included 
R2 56.82% 
N 43,322 
 
This table reports the regression results of income smoothing (SMTHt,t+4) on managerial ability and controls. MA-
Score is the decile rank of managerial ability by industry and year. We include firm and year fixed effects in the 
model but do not report them in the table for brevity. The sample is comprised of 43,322 observations from 
Compustat for the years 1991 to 2011. All tests are two-tailed. ** and *** denote significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 
levels, respectively. See Appendix I for the definitions of the variables. 
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TABLE 4 
Impact of Smoothing by High Ability Managers  
on Current Earnings Informativeness about Future Cash Flows 
 
Panel A. Analyses based on total smoothing  
 Dependent variable = CFOt+1 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coefficient
s 
t-value Coefficient
s 
t-value Coefficient
s 
t-value 
Et 0.367*** (62.77) 0.342*** (39.84) 0.345*** (31.93) 
CFOt-1 0.082*** (11.41) 0.160*** (13.52) 0.148*** (10.01) 
SMTHt-4, t   0.009** (2.51) 0.011** (2.46) 
SMTHt-4, t×Et   0.075*** (3.54) -0.053* (-1.90) 
SMTHt-4, t×CFOt-1   -0.176*** (-8.28) -0.143*** (-4.96) 
HighAbt     0.014*** (4.13) 
Et×HighAbt     -0.020 (-1.13) 
CFOt-1×HighAbt     0.018 (0.84) 
SMTHt-4, t×HighAbt     -0.014** (-2.29) 
SMTHt-4, t×Et×HighAbt     0.274*** (6.43) 
SMTHt-4, t×CFOt-1×HighAbt     -0.055 (-1.32) 
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included 
R2 59.95% 60.02% 60.15% 
N 43,322 43,322 43,322 
 
Panel B. The coefficient on current earnings (Et) across high and low values of managerial 
ability and smoothing 
 Low ability High ability Difference test
Low smoothing (A) 
0.345*** 
(B) 
0.325*** 
(B) – (A) 
-0.020 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.258) 
High smoothing (C) 0.292*** (D) 0.546*** (D) – (C) 0.254*** (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Difference test (C) –(A) -0.053* (D) –(B) 0.221***   (0.057) (<0.0001)   
 
Panel A of this table reports the regression results of future cash flows on current earnings with the interactions of 
smoothing and managerial ability (HighAb). The dependent variable is one-year-ahead cash flows, measured as cash 
flows from operations scaled by lagged total assets. HighAb takes the value of one if MA-Score is above the median, 
and zero otherwise. We use the percentile rank that takes a value between zero and one for SMTHt-4, t. We include 
firm and year fixed effects in the model but do not report them in the table for brevity. The sample is comprised of 
43,322 observations from Compustat for the years 1991 to 2011. Panel B presents the estimated coefficient on 
current earnings (Et) across high and low values of managerial ability and smoothing, along with p-values in 
parentheses. Specifically, we use the lowest and highest values of HighAbt (i.e., 0/1) and the lowest and highest 
values of SMTHt-4, t (i.e., 0/1) along with the estimated coefficients in column 3 of Panel A. All tests are two-tailed. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. See Appendix I for the definitions of 
the variables. 
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TABLE 5  
Impact of Smoothing by High Ability Managers  
on Stock Price Informativeness about Future Cash Flows 
 
Panel A. Analyses based on total smoothing  
 Dependent variable = Rt 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coefficients t-value Coefficients t-value Coefficients t-value 
XACt-1 -0.282*** (-13.75) -0.166*** (-6.14) -0.130*** (-4.23) 
XACt 0.313*** (11.26) 0.236*** (6.02) 0.170*** (3.69) 
XACt+1 0.105*** (4.04) -0.032 (-0.88) -0.080* (-1.82) 
XCFt-1 -0.306*** (-12.74) -0.478*** (-12.74) -0.514*** (-11.05) 
XCFt 0.497*** (16.75) 0.580*** (12.54) 0.579*** (9.87) 
XCFt+1 0.137*** (5.14) 0.224*** (5.74) 0.217*** (4.32) 
Rt+1 -0.317*** (-25.75) -0.308*** (-20.85) -0.288*** (-17.07) 
SMTHt-4, t   0.120*** (7.08) 0.121*** (5.51) 
SMTHt-4, t×XACt-1   -0.231*** (-5.00) -0.164*** (-2.65) 
SMTHt-4, t×XACt   0.150** (2.49) 0.240*** (2.89) 
SMTHt-4, t×XACt+1   0.281*** (5.26) 0.199*** (2.74) 
SMTHt-4, t×XCFt-1   0.219*** (3.55) 0.430*** (5.09) 
SMTHt-4, t×XCFt   -0.086 (-1.24) -0.041 (-0.41) 
SMTHt-4, t×XCFt+1   -0.125** (-2.14) -0.261*** (-3.07) 
SMTHt-4, t×Rt+1   -0.019 (-1.15) -0.019 (-0.86) 
HighAbt     0.148*** (9.08) 
XACt-1×HighAbt     -0.098*** (-2.64) 
XACt×HighAbt     0.135** (2.34) 
XACt+1×HighAbt     0.139** (2.55) 
XCFt-1×HighAbt     0.069 (1.07) 
XCFt×HighAbt     -0.010 (-0.13) 
XCFt+1×HighAbt     0.016 (0.25) 
Rt+1×HighAbt     -0.039** (-2.39) 
SMTHt-4, t×HighAbt     -0.014 (-0.51) 
SMTHt-4, t×XACt-1×HighAbt     -0.109 (-1.22) 
SMTHt-4, t×XACt×HighAbt     -0.235* (-1.97) 
SMTHt-4, t×XACt+1×HighAbt     0.124 (1.20) 
SMTHt-4, t×XCFt-1×HighAbt     -0.425*** (-3.53) 
SMTHt-4, t×XCFt×HighAbt     -0.100 (-0.72) 
SMTHt-4, t×XCFt+1×HighAbt     0.256** (2.24) 
SMTHt-4, t×Rt+1×HighAbt     0.013 (0.41) 
Control variables and their 
interactions Included Included Included 
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included 
R2 47.83% 48.11% 48.55% 
N 43,322 43,322 43,322 
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Table 5 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B. The coefficient on future cash flows (CFOt+1) across high and low values of 
managerial ability and smoothing 
 Low ability High ability Difference test
Low smoothing (A) 0.217*** (B) 0.233*** (B) – (A) 0.016 (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.801) 
High smoothing (C) -0.044 (D) 0.228*** (D) – (C) 0.272*** (0.437) (<0.0001) (0.0001) 
Difference test (C) –(A) -0.261*** (D) –(B) -0.005   (0.002) (0.949)   
 
Panel C. Stock price informativeness tests using short-window returns 
 Dependent variable = R(-10,+20) Dependent variable = R(-40, -11) 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficients t-value Coefficients t-value 
XACt-1 -0.030*** (-2.89) -0.011 (-1.18) 
XACt -0.004 (-0.27) 0.015 (1.02) 
XACt+1 0.044*** (2.88) -0.012 (-0.88) 
XCFt-1 -0.045*** (-2.85) -0.027* (-1.82) 
XCFt 0.039* (1.92) 0.037** (2.00) 
XCFt+1 0.026 (1.53) -0.009 (-0.59) 
Rt+1 0.100*** (17.36) 0.052*** (9.76) 
SMTHt-4, t -0.003 (-0.39) 0.000 (0.06) 
SMTHt-4, t×XACt-1 0.003 (0.15) -0.037* (-1.93) 
SMTHt-4, t×XACt 0.041 (1.45) 0.024 (0.91) 
SMTHt-4, t×XACt+1 -0.050** (-2.01) -0.006 (-0.25) 
SMTHt-4, t×XCFt-1 0.043 (1.51) -0.032 (-1.23) 
SMTHt-4, t×XCFt 0.007 (0.19) 0.009 (0.29) 
SMTHt-4, t×XCFt+1 -0.060** (-2.08) -0.016 (-0.60) 
SMTHt-4, t×Rt+1 0.009 (1.15) -0.015** (-2.12) 
HighAbt 0.003 (0.59) 0.004 (0.80) 
XACt-1×HighAbt -0.014 (-1.08) 0.021* (1.87) 
XACt×HighAbt 0.013 (0.64) 0.018 (1.02) 
XACt+1×HighAbt -0.039** (-2.08) 0.003 (0.16) 
XCFt-1×HighAbt -0.040* (-1.79) 0.027 (1.32) 
XCFt×HighAbt -0.023 (-0.89) 0.003 (0.11) 
XCFt+1×HighAbt -0.007 (-0.34) -0.008 (-0.40) 
Rt+1×HighAbt 0.002 (0.37) 0.001 (0.18) 
SMTHt-4, t×HighAbt -0.009 (-1.01) -0.004 (-0.42) 
SMTHt-4, t×XACt-1×HighAbt 0.054* (1.79) 0.027 (0.99) 
SMTHt-4, t×XACt×HighAbt -0.058 (-1.44) -0.093** (-2.49) 
SMTHt-4, t×XACt+1×HighAbt 0.093*** (2.64) 0.023 (0.71) 
SMTHt-4, t×XCFt-1×HighAbt 0.067 (1.64) 0.025 (0.66) 
SMTHt-4, t×XCFt×HighAbt -0.027 (-0.58) -0.065 (-1.49) 
SMTHt-4, t×XCFt+1×HighAbt 0.069* (1.78) 0.034 (0.95) 
SMTHt-4, t×Rt+1×HighAbt -0.008 (-0.76) 0.005 (0.52) 
Control variables and their 
interactions Included Included 
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Included Included 
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R2 28.27% 25.77%
N 41,907 41,935
Panel A of this table reports the regression results of the expanded FERC model with the interactions of smoothing 
and managerial ability (HighAb). The dependent variable is the cumulative buy-and-hold return for fiscal year t. 
HighAb takes the value of one if MA-Score is above the median, and zero otherwise. XCF is measured as cash flows 
from operations for year t, deflated by the market value of equity at the beginning of fiscal year t. XAC is measured 
as total accruals (IB-OANCF) for year t, deflated by the market value of equity at the beginning of fiscal year t. We 
use the percentile rank that takes a value between zero and one for SMTHt-4, t. Firm size, earnings volatility, the 
number of analysts, institutional holdings, and their interactions are included in the model but the coefficients are 
not reported here for brevity. We include firm and year fixed effects in the model but do not report them in the table 
for brevity. The sample is comprised of 43,322 observations from Compustat for the years 1991 to 2011. Panel B 
presents the estimated coefficient on future cash flows (CFOt+1) across high and low values of managerial ability 
and smoothing. Specifically, we use the lowest and highest values of HighAbt (i.e., 0/1) and the lowest and highest 
values of SMTHt-4, t (i.e., 0/1) along with the estimated coefficients in column 3 of Panel A. Panel C reports the 
regression results of the expanded FERC model with the interactions of smoothing and managerial ability (HighAb) 
using short-window returns around (before) earnings announcement dates. The dependent variable for column 1 is 
the earnings announcement return measured over the 30-day period that starts 10 days before and ends 20 days after 
the earnings announcement date (R(-10, +20)). The dependent variable for column 2 is the pre-earnings 
announcement return measured over the 30-day period that starts 40 days before and ends 11 days before the 
earnings announcement date (R(-40, -11)). Firm size, earnings volatility, the number of analysts, institutional 
holdings, and their interactions are included in the model but the coefficients are not reported here for brevity. We 
include firm and year fixed effects in the model but do not report them in the table for brevity. The sample are 
41,907 and 41,935 firm-year observations from Compustat for the years 1991 to 2011 for column 1 and column 2, 
respectively. All tests are two-tailed. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
See Appendix 1 for the definitions of the variables. 
